Messages the server cannot read.
Text, files, voice notes and video circles are encrypted on your device before they leave it. The server keeps ciphertext, hands it back to the people in the chat, and has no way to open it.
How it works
End-to-end by default
X25519 for key agreement, XChaCha20-Poly1305 for content. Your private key is backed up only under a passphrase the server never sees.
Calls go direct
Audio and video travel between browsers over WebRTC and are encrypted by DTLS. The server relays signalling only.
Invite only
An Eclair account is not enough: someone already here has to give you their personal invite link.
Nothing external
No third-party CDNs, fonts, analytics or trackers. A blocked CDN cannot break the app because there isn't one.
Being honest about the limits
- Metadata is visible to the server: who talks to whom, when, and how large the files are.
- No forward secrecy yet: someone who steals your private key can read past messages.
- Key substitution is caught only by comparing fingerprints with the other person.
- Telegram bridge chats are not end-to-end encrypted — they pass through the server in the clear and are labelled inside the app.
- The interface is in Russian for now.